Infrastructure for confidential coordination
This essay is the third in a series on confidential coordination. It explains how execution is structured across a distributed network so encrypted inputs can produce shared, verifiable outcomes without any single operator controlling the process.
The work coming out of the Interfold sits at the intersection of some of the most ambitious ideas in modern cryptography: multi-party computation (MPC), threshold encryption, verifiable computation, and emerging primitives like indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Privacy is no longer just about hiding data, but about coordinating computation across many parties
This essay is the second in a series on confidential coordination. It argues that once private inputs must produce a shared outcome, execution authority becomes the central problem, and solving it requires a network rather than a single execution environment.
Privacy-first software is often defined by what it refuses to collect. In messaging products, that refusal can be explicit: no phone numbers, no identifiers, and no collection of user data or metadata. Built as a decentralized, onion-routed messaging network, Session represents one of the clearest attempts to carry that logic
This essay is the first in a series on confidential coordination: producing shared outcomes from private inputs without data exposure or single-operator control. The Interfold is the distributed network that implements it.
